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UNITED STATES: FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM RULES CONCERNING
INTERNATIONAL BANKING FACILITIES*
Introductory Note
A complement to the post World War II extension of convertibility
to Western European nations' currencies was the tremendous growth in the
international capital market in the 1960s and 1970s. These markets are
ones where banks can fund their lending and make loans, and nonbanks
borrow and/or float notes or bond issues, free of domestic money and
bond market regulation and often at better -- or at least different --
rates than in the domestic capital markets. For multinational banks and
merchant bankers, participation in these markets can be both profitable
and a reliable cushion against periods of domestic stringency. At one
point First National City Bank was reporting approximately 60% of its
earnings from international business. Moreover the markets themselves
were and are celebrated as the mechanism by which the OPEC surpluses
were "recycled," thus "saving" the international monetary system from
toppling into the petrodollar sands. (That the largely unregulated
"recycling itself may have created another form of instability -- very
heavy Third World and Eastern European debt to the private system -- is
only now being recognized).
The position in these markets of multinational banks headquartered
in the United States was, however, always anomalous. The great bulk of
the trade in the international capital markets is denominated in dollars,
the national currency of banks headquartered in the United States, but
*[The Introductory Note was prepared for International Legal
Materials by Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Boston College Law School.
[The Federal Reserve Rules concerning International Banking Facili-
ties begin at I.L.M. page 878. As of July 30, 1982, nine states had
passed specific legislation concerning international banking facili-
ties. They are: California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Maryland, New York, North Carolina and Washington. In general, this
state legislation exempts international banking facilities from state
and local income or franchise taxes.
[The International Banking Act of 1978, referred to in the Intro-
ductory Note, appears at 18 I.LoM. 167 (1979).]
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because of the particular form of regulation of banking utilized in the
United States, these banks could only participate in the so-called
Eurocurrency markets through offshore branches or subsidiaries at which
the offshore loans and deposits could be booked. Thus the 1960s saw the
opening of London branches by over 100 United States banks and the 1970s
the "shell" branches in the Caribbean. The form of regulation of U.S.
banking that forced U.S. banks to open offshore offices to participate
in the Eurocurrency.markets is the system of attempting to control the
domestic money supply through reserve requirements, requirements that
commercial banks hold a particular portion of their deposits in non-
interest bearing accounts with the Federal Reserve banks. The original
legislation setting up the system of reserve requirements is part of the
Federal Reserve Act; the regulation under it is Regulation D of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 12 C.F.R. Part 204.
To the extent that any particular deposit (or borrowing by a bank
as Regulation D defines numerous liabilities of banks as being included
in "reservable" deposits) is subject to being reserved against, that
deposit costs the bank taking it more than a deposit to which the reserve
requirements are not applicable. If deposits cost U.S. banks more, they
cannot compete on an equal basis with other multinational banks for
international deposits. Equally, U.S. banking regulation, for reasons
of domestic policy, has limited the amount of interest that banks may
pay on deposits and other liabilities included in "deposits." (The
regulation setting out the interest rate ceilings for commercial and
savings banks is Regulation Q. 12 C.F.R. Part 217). Once again, if U.S.
banks cannot bid more than the interest ceiling for deposits, they
cannot compete in the international money markets for funds to lend.
However, very early on in the history of these forms of banking regulation,
the Federal Reserve Board (the Fed), fully aware of the need of the few
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United States banks that had foreign branches to compete abroad with the
differently regulated banks of the countries in which the branches were
located, had interpreted the reserve and interest rate legislation
not to apply to deposits "payable only abroad." Conceivably, this term
could have covered deposits booked at offices within the United States
but which were, by the deposit contract, payable at a location (the
office of a foreign correspondent bank) abroad, but in practice the term
came to mean deposits which were booked on foreign branch or subsidiary
books and appeared as liabilities of those offices. (National banks, by
a quirk of the law, are required to keep separate books of account for
foreign branches.) Hence, when in the 1960s the opportunitites for
profit by participation in the international money and capital markets
became evident to many more U.S. banks than just those that had tradition-
ally had a foreign branch network, the rush to open on site London
offices through which the business could be done -- free of reserve
requirements and interest rate limitations. (The Carribbean "shell"
branches offered tax advantages in addition.)
Obviously, however, if numerous U.S. banks raise funds abroad
through their London offices free of reserve requirements and then
either send those funds back to their head offices in the United States
for domestic lending or lend those funds to customers for use in the
United States, the supply of "money" in the domestic economy is increased
and, depending on the relative cost of those funds, the banks with the
London offices have a competitive advantage over banks without the
foreign office that must sterilize some portion of the deposits they get
in the reserve accounts. (U.S. branches of foreign banks had the same
competitive advantage until the International Banking Act of 1978, Pub.
L. 95-369, Sept. 17, 1978, 92 Stat. 607, applied reserve requirements to
deposits booked in the U.S. by foreign banks). This problem of use in
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the United States economy of "unreservable" funds is one that is referred
to by those concerned with monetary policy as "leakage." To counter
this erosion of its monetary tool of reserve requirements, the Fed
developed an elaborate set of amendments to Regulation D that made funds
raised abroad reservable against if the banks brought them home or lent
them to customers for use in the United States. For a complete history
of the tinkering with Regulation D and Congress' finger in the pie with
the Monetary Control Act of 1980, see Lichtenstein, U.S. Banks and the
Eurocurrency Markets: The Regulatory Structure, 99 Banking L.J. 484-511
(1982). Within the limitations of the Regulation D dike against "leakage,"
U.S. banks continued to participate in the Eurocurrency business through
their foreign offices.
However, whatever the tax, interest rate and reserveless advantages
of deposits booked at offshore offices, the offshore deposit gathering
capacity has one large disadvantage: for the purposes of so-called
"country risk," those deposits are situated abroad, within someone
else's territorial jurisdiction. While the United States has had the
temerity to assert jurisdiction (for such purposes as the blocking
orders against the Iranian government's assets in the hostage crisis)
over deposits in U.S. banks' and bank subsidiaries' offshore offices,
no one has ever suggested that such offshore deposits in U.S. owned banks
are immune from the jurisdiction of the host country. In times when the
dollar is strong, or for other reasons it seems desirable to hold liquid
dollar assets, a dollar short-term or even demand account on the books
of a bank in London or Hong-Kong or Bonn is very nice; but even so,
London or Hong Kong or Bonn might choose sdddenly to impose exchange
controls on the movement of foreign currencies within their borders.
(Remember, all any party to the IMF Agreement has promised in that
treaty to do is to buy and sell its own currency; no one (other than the
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U.S.) promises under Art. IV of IMF Agreement to allow free trading in
U.S. dollars within its territory.)
Clearly, therefore, U.S. multinational banks could compete in the
Eurocurrency markets best if they could offer to take dollar deposits
booked and payable within the United States. (The banks had already
long since tried the gimmick of head office guarantee of foreign branch
deposits; Fed had ruled that such a guarantee made the deposits reservable.
See Lichtenstein, op. cit., at 488.) Thus, on July 14, 1978, having
already persuaded the New York legislature to pass a bill exempting the
income from Eurocurrency business brought "home" to New York from New
York State and City taxes if the Fed would exempt such "free-zone banking"
from reserve requirements, the twelve New York banks that make up the
membership of the New York Clearing House submitted to the Fed a position
paper entitled "International Banking Facilities in the United States:
An Analysis of the Economic Policy Issues" urging that Fed amend Regula-
tions D and Q to permit U.S. banks to book foreign owned deposits in the
U.S. and use (loan out) those deposits free of reserve requirements and
interest rate limitations so long as the funds did not leak into the
U.S. domestic economy. A student note, International Banking Facilities:
Defining A Greater U.S. Presence in the Eurodollar Market, 13 L. and
Pol. in Int'l Bus. 997, 1003-1023, gives in full detail the history of
support for and opposition to the Clearing House proposal from its
submission to Fed through the Senate Hearings, Edge Corporation Branching;
Foreign Bank Takeovers; and International Banking Facilities; Hearing
Before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (July 16 and 20, 1979), to the final promulgation by the
Federal Reserve Board of the Amendments to Regulations D and Q permitting
the establishment of International Banking Facilities (IBF). It is
these amendments, 46 Fed. Reg. 32, 426 et seq. (June 23, 1981), that are
reprinted below.
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The provisions are almost impossible to understand out of context
because of being drafted as additions to and amendments of Regulations D
and Q. The technicalities are explained somewhat in Lichtenstein, op.
cit. and fully in the student note, op. cit.: the point is that if
Euromarket funds (i.e. funds belonging to other banking institutions
dealing in the Euromarkets, non U.S. entities other than banking institu-
tions, or foreign affiliates of U.S. corporations that will use such
funds for operations abroad) are booked at the IBFs and are only used
(i.e. lent out or used to purchase liabilities of IBF eligible customers)
for this particular set of customers, the funds are not counted for
reserve requirement purposes. If, on the other hand, the U.S. bank
borrows from its IBF, that is, uses the facility as a way of raising
funds for the bank's participation in the domestic economy, then the IBF
funds will be counted as part of the type of deposits against which the
bank must hold 3% reserves. The aim of all the technical qualifications
upon what may be in an IBF (e.g., the requirement that deposits from
nonbanking institutions cannot be withdrawn before two business days
after the date of deposit or date of notice of withdrawal) is to ensure
that the assets and liablities so booked are not substitutes for more
expensive domestic transactions. Apparently the rearranging of the
monetary dike to permit Eurocurrency transactions enclaves within the
United States has been successful; Washington Financial Reports, Vol. 39, No. 1
of July 15, 1982 at p.13 reports that the IBFs have booked $128 billion
in loans and over $113 billion in deposits since December 3, 1981, the
first date of opening of the facilities and quotes a Fed economist to
the effect that there has not been a problem with "leakage."
